Abstract One of the dominant themes in development programmes over the last fifteen years has been a commitment to capacity building. This paper investigates the forms of capacity building in Aceh, Indonesia, since the devastating earthquake and tsunami that hit the province on 26 December 2004. Despite the preference of the Acehnese people for reconstruction processes based on the principles of community development, local people have been largely marginalized by both the Indonesian government and the international aid and development agencies. The paper suggests some of the reasons for this marginalization.
1 The project, with Associate Professor Greg Barton and Professor Sue Kenny of Deakin University as chief investigators, has been funded by the Australian Research Council. The research was designed to investigate the principles, promises, and realities of capacity building programmes in Islamic NGOs in Indonesia. It involves a study of the ways in which Islamic NGOs understand capacity building as a means, a process, and an end in development. It investigates the rhetoric and the promises of capacity building approaches as well as the specific strategies and practices of capacity building. 2 The methodology involved purposive sampling of twelve regions in Indonesia and the construction of a database of all NGOs in each region. The final NGO sample was drawn from this database and includes all local NGOs in each region that fulfil the following criteria. (a) They have all the characteristics of a third sector organization as specified in the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (Salamon et al., 1999, pp. 3 -4) . (b) They draw explicitly on their Islamic identity or have an implicit Islamic identity by virtue of their values or the background and commitments of its key members. (c) They are concerned with 'moderate' forms of Islam, orientated towards civil society concerns, rather than a narrow Islamist agenda (see Barton, 2005 , for a discussion of the varieties of Islam); Primary source material is collected from interviews with members of the NGOs, government officials and international aid and development agencies. NGO workshops provided participant observation data. Secondary sources used include local NGO pamphlets and booklets, government and international agencies' press releases, media reports, and websites. 3 Given the dominance of Islamic culture, most local NGOs in the region can be identified as moderate and conservative Muslim NGOs. Members of the research team have been working for a number of years as part of a network of NGOs, including Acehnese NGOs, based around Indonesia's largest NGO, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the very large mass-based, traditionalist Islamic organization, which has a claimed membership in the order of 35 to 40 million members (Barton, 2001) . The researchers do not have systematic data regarding the views of those holding more radical Islamist views but secondhand information indicates that they are even more critical of the international and national aid and reconstruction efforts.and over 430,000 have been displaced, most having lost all their possessions.
Brief history of Aceh
Aceh has a tumultuous history. In the thirteenth century, Aceh established itself as an important trading centre in South East Asia and by the seventeenth century it had became embroiled in conflicts between the Dutch and the English over colonial domination of the region. In 1873, the Netherlands formally declared war on the Acehnese and invaded Aceh, which continued intermittently until Japanese occupation in 1942. In 1949 the United Nations brokered an agreement to transfer all the former colonial territory of the Dutch East Indies to the sovereign state of the Federal Republic of Indonesia (which became the Republic of Indonesia in 1950). Aceh was included in the new Republic, despite having never been formally incorporated as a Dutch colonial possession. Since 1950, political and economic dominance of Aceh has been maintained by non-Acehnese and there has been a continued repressive presence of the Indonesian military, albeit within the tokenistic framework of a limited religious, cultural and educational autonomy. Throughout this period, the Acehnese have continued their struggle for independence, since 1976 led by an armed resistance group Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM (Free Aceh Movement). Sporadic fighting, repressive military responses, and Indonesian government edicts, including declaration of martial law in 2003 and a state of civil emergency in May 2004, have made it difficult, and at times impossible, for both local and international NGOs to operate in the region.
The disaster of 26 December 2004 brought with it the deaths of thousands of the protagonists in the civil conflict and the urgent need for international and national aid, resulting in the temporary, and then permanent lifting of civil restrictions by the Indonesian government, including the removal of the somewhat weakened 'State of Civil Emergency' in Aceh on 18 May 2005 (The Jakarta Post, 13 May 2005). It was the huge scale of the tragedy that forced the Indonesian government to open the Acehnese border, albeit reluctantly, and to agree to the promise of massive international and national relief.
In a bleak irony, the wiping out of so many physical resources and much of the population, and the promise of unprecedented aid to rebuild Aceh also meant that, as one NGO worker has put it, 'Aceh could become a development laboratory'. In January 2005, as the immediate relief effort of provision of clean water, food, and tents arrived in Aceh, both local people and international agencies began to talk about the need for capacity building projects. This paper investigates the ways in which the discourse and practices of capacity building are constructed in the rebuilding of Aceh.
Forms of capacity building in Aceh
Capacity building has been in vogue internationally for over a decade. It is linked to a commitment to what has come to be known as 'people-based development' or 'alternative development' (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001 ) that arose out of the dissatisfaction with the preoccupation with economism and the top-down policies that have been driving structural adjustment programmes (Todaro, 1994) . Capacity-building programmes involve activities aimed at developing the skills, resources or knowledge of groups, organizations or nations. For example, Chaskin et al.(2001) note that capacity building is essentially about strengthening community capacities to identify priorities and opportunities and to foster and sustain positive change. They define capacity building in terms of 'the interaction of human capital, organizational resources and social capital existing within a given community that can be leveraged to solve collective problems and improve and maintain the well-being of that community' (Chaskin et al., 2001, p. 7) . Similarly, Eade and Williams (1995) describe Oxfam's approach to capacity building as strengthening the capacity of the poor to organize together and to recognize their common interests in working for a fairer world (Eade and Williams, 1995, p. 331) .
Capacity building now features in one way or another in most international development programmes, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. The appeal of capacity building lies in its contrast with traditional welfare and aid programmes, which have been donor-driven and input oriented. At their best, capacity building practices promise long-term self-management, local knowledge, participation and control (United Nations Development Programme, 1997). In practical terms, capacity building refers to specific approaches, strategies, and methodologies used for the purpose of improving the performance of individuals, communities, community organizations, and countries to carry out particular functions. Methodologies for capacity building can involve education and on-the-job training; provision of information, finance and technology; facilitating supportive relationships or what is often known as bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000) ; and facilitating the development of legal frameworks and human resource policies. What improving capacity or performance actually means can vary. Capacity building can be a means to an end or an end in itself. As a means, capacity building can involve training to equip people to develop technical skills (such as building, nursing, and other professional skills), organizational skills, or business skills. As an end, capacity building can involve lifting the general skill level of the members of a community so that they feel 'empowered' to control their own lives. There is also a variety of ways in which capacity building can be implemented. For example, change can be initiated top-down or bottom-up. It can be generated internally or externally. The parties involved can be governments, NGOs, or communities. Finally, capacity building can involve provision of resources, training, expert advice, or funds.
It is possible to identify three broad forms of capacity building that have become evident in Aceh during the past months, each drawing on a particular approach to development. The first form draws on the principles of community development. This approach is evident mainly in the small local NGOs, although there are community development practitioners operating within some international agencies and the term community development is found in a number of descriptions of large government and international projects. The second form applies the idea of capacity building as skilling and training. It is evident in the large international NGOs, particularly those funded by international governments and operating in a semi-autonomous capacity. The final form of capacity building involves reconstruction through external experts, who apply their knowledge, skills, and resources prior to, or concurrently with, the development of the local political, social, and economic infrastructure. In this last approach, capacity building begins from assessing the deficits of the local population. This is the dominant form of capacity building in Aceh.
Capacity building as community development
The community development approach to capacity building is not only 'people-based', but is essentially a form of endogenous development that begins with a commitment to community control. It involves the members of a community collectively defining their goals, needs, and priorities (Campfrens, 1997; Kenny, 1999) . The members also decide on what they might need from outsiders, if anything, in assisting them. In this form, capacity building can be an end in itself and a means to an end. It is internally generated and bottom-up in character. In Aceh, the most obvious example of capacity building as community development is in the work of local NGOs, some of which existed before the tsunami and many of which were established subsequently. The aim of most of these NGOs is to provide direct, 'unmediated' assistance to survivors. In explaining their commitment to community development, our interviewees have emphasized the need to validate the authenticity of life in the kampongs and villages, where people are struggling to reestablish themselves. They point out that the key elements of such approaches are trust, immediacy, and small-scale projects. For example, the Forum Bangun Aceh (Forum for the Development of Aceh) or FBA, is committed to . . .the belief that the empowerment of survivors and their active involvement in the process is the key to recovery . . . the strength and resilience of the Acehnese people themselves is the most valuable asset for the recovery of the province and its people . . . Aceh should be rebuilt by the Acehnese and for the Acehnese . . . the role of outsiders is merely to facilitate and assist them in their task. The practical application of these principles is evident in their programmes and practices, such as grants, microcredit, and soft loans to families and kampongs with a view to restarting livelihoods. The FBA focus is on capacity building as supporting many small projects based on small amounts of money. For example, a loan of US $300 is enough to purchase cooking equipment and basic ingredients, which can be used to restart a small family business in the form of a street stall or warung.
Perhaps the most important immediate need, in the eyes of our interviewees, has been to return to the place where their house once stood and reclaim their identity, their links with their immediate community, and their livelihoods. One step in this process is what is known as community mapping. Community mapping involves people, usually at the level of hamlets, the smallest settlement units working together to draw a map of their neighbourhood before the tsunami, including the dwellings, roads, trees and public buildings. It is anticipated that this map (usually reworked with professional planners) will become the basis of the vision for redevelopment. As Azwar Hasan, the chairperson of Forum Bangun Aceh, states:
The assumption is that only the residents . . . know with a great deal of certainty the status and ownership of each parcel of land.
Many Acehnese are now bypassing the delays and official red tape associated with official control and direction of their future, setting up shelters (of tents, tarpaulins, and wooden shacks) on the site where they believe their house once stood, seeking a bottom-up approach to the reestablishment of communities. They are reclaiming their identity and their community regardless of official policies and programmes.
The discourse of community development is evident in many of the websites and reports of a number of the large international NGOs, including the UNDP, Oxfam, and USAID. The issue raised by many of our interviewees, however, is how far the rhetoric is put into practice. In regard to this issue, the views expressed by our interviewees have been mixed. For example, members of local NGOs have commented favourably on the capacity building principles of those international government programmes and NGOs that have not only asked local communities about their priorities, but are also prepared to fund local NGOs in a hands-off manner, particularly where international agencies provide unencumbered resources for development of NGO offices and equipment, or what Oxfam recognizes as operational capacity.
Yet the dominant view among Acehnese NGOs is that the grand rhetoric of capacity building as community development is not matched by the activities and practices of the international agencies. Over five months after the tsunami there is physically little evidence of reconstruction and significant self-determination is seen as almost impossible. Thousands of people have been classified as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and are required to live in the tent cities hastily constructed after the tsunami, or are being moved into barrack accommodation by the authorities. Posttraumatic stress is exacerbated in these camps and barracks, and given the extent of control by government and the military community, development is rendered largely inoperative.
Appeal and limitations of community development
Before we become sanctimonious about the superiority and promises of the community development approach, it is important to acknowledge some of the difficulties in practice and the complexity of the relief and reconstruction effort in Aceh. In privileging 'the community' and 'participation', community development practice can gloss over the diversity of views and existing inequalities in any community (Cooke and Kothari, 2001 ). In Aceh, power imbalances existed before the tsunami and have resurfaced afterwards, sometimes taking different forms. In the disarray, some groups of survivors fared better than others. The more organized survivors, particularly men, negotiated better support than the less organized or less assertive groups.
Indeed, there are some weaknesses in working solely within a community development framework. For example, NGOs working with a community development framework and left to their own devices can be fragmented, incoherent, easily captured by small elitist community groups, and unaccountable. Currently, there is much discussion about the need for more effective coordination, or 'harmonization' of international and national relief in times of massive humanitarian disasters. This discussion is no less relevant in Aceh, where there is considerable criticism of unnecessary duplication and waste in some areas, with almost no relief or support in other areas. The massive physical reconstruction effort in Aceh does require some central coordination, a blueprint, and effective use of resources. However, these factors should not exempt any planning and reconstruction process from the requirement of community participation.
Capacity building as training
Both international NGOs and international government agencies have a specific focus on training as a key method of capacity building. Here capacity building involves notions of increasing abilities through developing appropriate skills, knowledge, attitudes, values, and behaviours to change individuals so that they can function well in the existing aid context. This approach tends to be both top-down and based on a deficit model of capacity, in which the focus is on external intervention to 'create capacity'. Training can involve skilling locals to undertake planning, land management, and governance tasks. It can also involve the skilling of community members in submission writing, strategic planning, and in establishing monitoring and evaluation frameworks, so that they can engage with international programmes. That is, capacity building involves the ability to apply Western discursive practice. What is important to understand in this approach is that, in general, it does not start with the needs as identified by local community members and it tends to exclude local participants as the trainers (because they do not have the requisite capacities). From the perspective of donor countries, one practical advantage is that aid money can be directed back to the donor country, through the employment of contractors and trainers from the donor country.
Capacity building as reconstruction
In Aceh there have been two different forms of capacity building based on externally driven reconstruction. The first form is small scale. It involves what has come to be known as the Cash for Work (CFW) programme and it involves payment to local people for participation in the clean-up and basic reconstruction. For example, in April 2005 Oxfam reported that they were supporting over 14,000 small CFW projects in Aceh (Oxfam, 2005) . While the CFW programme is restricted in time, scope, and funding (pay tends to be the equivalent to US $3 to $4 a day), and often has limited capacity building elements, it does provide a practical activity and a modicum of basic support.
The dominant approach to capacity building in Aceh is based on a commitment to medium-to large-scale reconstruction, which is carried out by external experts. This is based on the premise that the rebuilding of infrastructure requires top-down direction and coordination, through largescale government and international NGO activity. At the time of writing (May 2005) reconstruction has so far involved setting up bureaucratic structures for coordination and financial control, strategic and environmental planning and setting up new protocols and processes for rebuilding the social, economic, and political infrastructure.
5
Here capacity building is framed by the priorities of the Indonesian government and involves what aid agencies call 'G to G' (government to government) cooperation. Like the previous approach, it is based on a deficit model of the local population. Local companies are mostly rendered incapable of undertaking the strategic planning or technical social, political, and physical rebuilding necessary to the reconstruction process. However, in addition, given the Western concern about corruption in Indonesia and the preoccupation with probity and accountability, international governments and aid agencies are not prepared to 'take the risk' of trusting local NGOs to participate in large-scale reconstruction. Thus, the process of expert reconstruction excludes Acehnese NGOs and companies from both the tenders and the projects.
'Capacity as reconstruction' is perhaps best understood politically and theoretically in the context of the (Western) imperative for modernization (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001 ). It involves development through 'material and economic progress' (Todaro, 1994) and is 'linear, teleological, ethnocentric' (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001, p. 24) . In regard to such development programmes in Indonesia, we can also observe residues of Orientalism, which identifies Asia as 'Eastern', a unitary 'other' to Western culture (Said, 1978) . This Asian 'other' is at once three things: romantic/exotic, vulnerable/needing of protection, and dangerous/a threat. Both the actual international aid effort and Western media reports construct the posttsunami development effort through all these lenses of Orientalism. For example, one set of media perspectives portrays the Acehnese responses as part of a noble, if not romantic struggle for survival. Self-congratulatory, paternalistic approaches to aid are premised on the view that the Acehnese are vulnerable and in need of external support. In contrast, reports of corruption by Indonesian officials (see www.transparency.org/in_focus_ archive/tsunami/in_focus_tsunami.html) and the military focus attention on the so-called 'untrustworthiness' of the other, whereas the Islamist presence demonstrates the imagery of the 'Oriental' as threat.
5 On his appointment in May 2005, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the head of the country's reconstruction body, commented that the Indonesia's post-tsunami recovery was at a near standstill and that 'close to zero' of promised government funds had been disbursed (see Aglionby, J., 2005) . The reality of the failures of the aid programme is just becoming known and there is now much questioning about the destination of the billions of dollars of aid money donated by both ordinary people and governments from around the world.
Issues for the Acehnese
It is the idea of capacity building as training and the view that capacity building equates to reconstruction that are causing concern among local Acehnese. Indeed it is in the broad arena of the reconstruction effort that most anger and frustration is being expressed (Vitchek, 2005) . There are four main sources of anger and frustration. First, there is the slowness of the reconstruction effort, which has been hampered by the enormity of the task of reconstruction, the sheer bureaucratic complexities, and Indonesian government constraints on the activities of international agencies. Second are the ways in which over 400,000 displaced persons are being housed, first in unsatisfactory tent cities, often regimented and otherwise controlled by the TNI, and, increasingly, in cramped barracks, where it is estimated they will live for up to two years or more. This 'corralling', locals argue, takes away their privacy and independence and allows for new forms of surveillance by the military. Thirdly, there is anger at the deficit model of reconstruction applied by the international community and the failure to appreciate the immense capacity existing among the local people. Finally, the stark contrast between the living conditions of the victims of the tsunami and the international aid workers, which is now an all too familiar occurrence in international relief, is a source of considerable anger.
Shutting out the Acehnese
The major sites and agencies for the actual practices of community development in Aceh since the tsunami are the local NGOs. 'On the ground' community development methods, where they exist, are generally only a small part of the activities of international agencies, despite their use of community development rhetoric. Moreover, receipt of significant funds and resources from international governments and NGOs that are committed to community development principles nearly always requires the same or similar formal bureaucratic processes and structures that are necessary for Western NGOs to receive funds. These include an ability to speak English, completing a formal application, contractual obligations, and the requirement that probity mechanisms are in place. Applications can take months to be processed. Local Acehnese question the need for such extensive bureaucratic specifications and stress the sense of urgency in getting local people and NGOs back on their feet. Thus, capacity building is largely top-down and externally generated, often with limited reference to the needs and priorities of the local Acehnese, who become the objects, rather than the active agents or subjects, of the development process (Long, 1994) .
In this final section of the paper we explore the reasons why the Acehnese are being excluded from the processes and activities of capacity building. The first reason is well rehearsed in the aid community. It involves the argument that in times of massive disaster, there is such urgency in delivering relief that the international and national agencies have had no time to engage in community development based capacity building. However, as Eade and Williams (1995) point out, the need for urgency does not negate the principle of supporting people's capacity to take greater control of the forces that affect their lives. They note that while the pressures to deliver relief can mean overlooking the social and cultural aspects of people's lives, engagement with these traditions is essential if relief is not to damage communities further, through ill-conceived interventions. Many of our interviewees are arguing that much of the aid work so far has further disempowered them and led to wasteful, top-down interventions.
Nederveen Pieterse (2001, p. 24) reminds us that the theory and discourse of development still rests on the principle that the state is the major 'conductor and conduit' of development. The second reason why the Acehnese are excluded from capacity building is that the freedom to engage the local population is curtailed by the Indonesian government and military surveillance. Official Indonesian constraints have clearly limited the scope of the activities of international NGOs. The attitudes and views of Indonesian authorities in regard to international agency work has been important for NGOs, both because of the need to avoid the 'neo-colonial' label and because of the real possibility of expulsion. Officially, NGO activity has been restricted to the two main towns, Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, although this restriction has not been strictly enforced (Easton, 2005) .
Our interviewees understand the need for international agencies to tread carefully in the reconstruction effort. They point to the Acehnese history of authoritarianism, the repression by the military, and the government's use of the putative threat to international aid organizations posed by GAM. These interviewees also note that there is little mention or practice of capacity building or community development in the government and military contribution to the rebuilding of Aceh. Yet they also argue that government and military surveillance does not mitigate the need for international agencies to work with and for the local people.
The third reason is the sheer complexity of the reconstruction effort. It would seem that few international or local organizations have been unaware of the sheer size and complexity of the aid and reconstruction tasks and the complexities arising out of the tense historical and political context. The background tensions between GAM and the Indonesian military (the TNI) and the power struggles between the military, police, and the government have presented a complex backdrop to the reconstruction effort (McCulloch, 2005) . Even before the tsunami struck, much of the system of governance was dysfunctional. There was a contested land rights system and a weak civilian bureaucracy, both of which had been under effective control by the military. A number of villagers who had been caught in the fighting had already been displaced and resettled in camps (Easton, 2005) . In this matter, the effects of the tsunami added another basis for maintaining military control and surveillance. Add to these tensions and problems the additional difficulties arising from the destruction of official records, which compromises the possibility of government compensation and hinders the resolution of legal disputes, such as those arising out of property claims (Indonesian Government Press Release on Aceh Assessment, 19 January 2005). Practising community development in this context was always going to be difficult and the decades of military repression and human rights abuses have indelibly bruised Acehnese views of the prospects for self-determination.
The fourth explanation is that international agencies continue to operate with assumptions that have set the context of aid over the past four decades. That is, development theory has been constructed around Eurocentric notions that operate within the binary framework of 'the north' and 'south' and the 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' world. Countries identified as part of the south, including Indonesia, lack the capacities of 'the north'. As indicated above, Indonesia has always been located in the 'underdeveloped south' and broadly within the conceptual framework of Orientalism. It is then only 'natural' that development should involve externally generated building of a Western capitalist system, based on Western notions of enterprise, governance, and democracy. The view that local people in Aceh could or should organize themselves independently, mobilize what resources they have, and take the initiative in planning and reconstruction does not sit easily with this mainstream development orthodoxy, even when this orthodoxy is softened with the notion of 'people-centred' development.
The final explanation is the most troubling. It is set in the context of the marketization of aid, in which Western corporations see aid programmes as an opportunity for their own development. Both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors are cashing in on the lucrative contracts to manage and deliver expert reconstruction in Aceh. Indeed, the reconstruction effort provides an excellent opportunity for their capacity building, with few of the risks of everyday life that are carried by the local Acehnese.
As Naomi Klein (2005) points out, we are witnessing the rise of disaster capitalism. Klein argues that now that the traditional territories for capitalist adventure have largely disappeared, new territory has to be found, and this new territory exists in countries that have been 'smashed to rubble, whether by so-called Acts of God or by Acts of Bush'. From this perspective, aid has become just another mechanism for developing global markets for large corporations. Competition between the aid agencies is strong. Commenting on the sources of funding of non-profit organizations, Rana Foroohar, writing in the Civil Society Observer (January/February 2005), points out that eighty percent of the aid pie goes to the largest well-branded nonprofit organizations, who receive most of their money from governments. Moreover, as long as Western governments are looking for ways of improving their international image, then there will be pressure on aid organizations to practise self-censorship and to act as public relations agents for their governments. It is important to draw attention to the way in which the 'politics of aid' is being played out in Aceh because of the unprecedented amount of aid money that has been promised.
The effects of the marketization are far more insidious. As Klein (2005) points out, employment of highly paid foreign consultants ensures that locals are shut out of jobs, and foreign contractors reject the need for their own transparency, while lecturing governments and local NGOs on good governance and transparency.
6 Indeed, the inequities arising out of 'disaster capitalism' are many. While local Acehnese are herded into tent cities, many Western development experts are located in much plusher accommodation, sometimes where locals have been displaced. From this perspective, aid and reconstruction provide the twenty-first century's key launching pad for Western cultural and capitalist imperialism.
Conclusion
The response to the aid and reconstruction effort in Aceh so far has been a mixed, but mainly negative one. On the one hand, the immediate international relief effort, for example, the provision of water purification equipment and food, funding for the Cash for Work programme, and financial support for local NGOs, has been favourably received. On the other hand, the Acehnese are only too aware of the immense amounts of money promised for the relief and reconstruction programme and want to know how it is being spent. While cognizant of the tension between the need to show quick results and the need for thoughtful planning, they have responded angrily to the lack of progress in regard to reconstruction, and the overall failures on the part of the Indonesian government, particularly the failure to undertake genuine consultation in the development of a blueprint for rebuilding the physical infrastructure. They are also angry about the ever-menacing presence of the military, the apparent subservience of the international governments and NGOs to the Indonesian government, and the way in which international governments and NGOs see the reconstruction of Aceh in terms of their own pecuniary interests.
In a broader community development context, the Aceh reconstruction effort indicates how far the reality of contemporary development can slide away from the popular rhetoric of development from below, or development that is people-centred or 'alternative' (Korten, 1990; Rahman, 1993; Nederveen Pieterse, 2001) . Going by the experience in the significant 'development laboratory' of post-tsunami Aceh, it would seem that the extensive critiques of traditional development theory (for example, see Kothari, 1988; Korten, 1995; Brohman, 1996; Hudock 1999) have a long way to go before they will have effective practical purchase.
From the Acehnese point of view, capacity building based entirely on community development principles cannot solve all the issues that they are now dealing with in the task of rebuilding Aceh. However, it could provide some important starting points for reconstructing the political, economic, and social relations for a society committed to valuing ordinary people, a society that would provide a workable infrastructure for concrete forms of self-determination. Given the quagmire that belies the spin of progress in the official redevelopment of Aceh, it would seem that this vision for Aceh remains unattainable, although there are signs that small-scale community development as a process of internally driven selfdetermination has already begun.
